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URBAN RENEWAL AND SACRAMENTO’S LOST JAPANTOWN
THOMAS W. JOO *
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1950s, Sacramento, California demolished its Japantown in
the name of “urban renewal.” Most of the neighborhood’s residents had
been displaced to domestic concentration camps during World War II, and
had returned just a few years earlier. By 1961, every resident of the neighborhood had been forced out again, and nearly every structure destroyed.1
Like many other cities of the urban-renewal era, Sacramento used eminent
domain, or the threat thereof, to take inner-city property and transfer it to
private real estate developers. In addition to state, local, and federal funding, the costs of those transfers came from “vast, involuntary subsidies”
from displaced residents. 2 Those residents tended to be poor people and
people of color, 3 leading James Baldwin to famously deride urban renewal
as “Negro Removal.” 4
Carol Rose has cited examples of government property takings where
“denial of property is denial of membership in a community; it is a part of a
radical othering.” 5 Bernadette Atuahene has attempted to formalize this
notion by introducing the concept of “dignity takings,” in which “the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.” 6
* Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. I thank the participants at the
Chicago-Kent Law Review’s 2016 Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration symposium, the law
review, and especially Bernadette Atuahene for her insightful comments. Thanks also to the UC Davis
School of Law Intellectual Enrichment Committee, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Andrea Chandrasekher, Mark
Hoffman, Brian Soucek, UC Davis Shields Library Special Collections, and the UC Davis Mabie Law
Library staff (especially Rachael Smith and Aaron Dailey). I gratefully acknowledge the generous
financial support of UC Davis and the UC Davis School of Law. This research would not have been
possible without the remarkable archives and staff of the Center for Sacramento History, particularly
Patricia Johnson, Dylan McDonald, and Rebecca Crowther.
1. SACRAMENTO REDEV. AGENCY, SACRAMENTO REDEVELOPMENT 8 (1961) [hereinafter SR
1961].
2. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 5 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
4. Kenneth B. Clark, A Conversation with James Baldwin, in CONVERSATIONS WITH JAMES
BALDWIN 38, 42 (Fred L. Standley & Louis H. Pratt eds., 1989).
5. Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 1, 37 (2000).
6. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical
Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
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Atuahene’s original case study focused on the South African apartheid
regime’s expropriation of real property from nonwhites. Unlike those persons, Japantown’s displaced property owners received compensation
through the same orderly legal process as others subjected to eminent domain. There appears to be no concrete evidence of racist motivation. The
stated, plausible purposes of urban renewal in Japantown were increasing
property values and thereby tax receipts, as well as civic beautification. The
taking of Japantown property therefore seems to satisfy the requirements of
the U.S. Constitution.
Many displaced residents, however, expressed the belief that their
neighborhood had been singled out for unfair treatment because of their
Japanese heritage. The takings were consistent with prior and contemporaneous anti-Japanese government actions, such restrictions on immigration,
naturalization, property ownership, and, most egregiously, the incarceration
of Japanese and Japanese Americans in concentration camps during World
War II. 7 In this context, unspoken or unconscious racism could have played
a role in the decision to destroy Japantown despite community opposition.
Moreover, regardless of the government’s motivation, displaced residents,
as well as the general public, could reasonably perceive the destruction of
Japantown as manifesting official disregard for the human worth of Japanese and Japanese Americans. Thus, although the destruction of Japantown
was probably constitutional, it nonetheless inflicted dignitary harm.
II. JAPANTOWN AND JAPANESE AMERICANS
A. Federal and Californian Anti-Japanese Law and Policy
Japanese laborers and farmers began immigrating to the U.S. in significant numbers in the late nineteenth century. Japan’s rapid industrialization
contributed to a surplus of unskilled farm labor while the U.S., having
banned Chinese immigration in 1882, had a need for such labor. 8 As in
many cities, Sacramento’s Japanese ethnic enclave developed in part as a
defense mechanism against virulent racism. 9 A 1911 report by the U.S.
INQUIRY 796, 812 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration]; see also
Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
7. The incarceration is commonly, and inaccurately, referred to as the “internment.” “Internment” is a term of international law referring to the wartime detention of enemy aliens. During World
War II, however, the U.S. also incarcerated non-criminal American citizens of Japanese descent with no
proof of their disloyalty. See Yoshinori H.T. Himel, Americans’ Misuse of “Internment,” 14 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 797, 797–98 (2016).
8. KEVIN WILDIE, SACRAMENTO’S HISTORIC JAPANTOWN 15–16 (2013).
9. Id. at 38.
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Immigration Commission noted that many Japanese immigrants were selfemployed in small businesses due in part to “race prejudice.” 10 Urban unions created California’s Asiatic Exclusion League, and a Sacramento
chapter opened in 1908; the Japanese Exclusion League was founded in
1920. 11 V.S. McClatchy was an outspoken anti-Japanese activist who used
his newspaper, the influential Sacramento Bee, as his mouthpiece. As the
twentieth century progressed, nativists likened Japanese immigration to an
“invasion” of America, foreshadowing the racial paranoia that led to mass
incarceration during World War II. 12
Like other Asians, Japanese immigrants were barred from American
citizenship on the basis of their race until the mid-twentieth century. A
1790 statute permitted only “free white persons” to become naturalized
citizens. After the Civil War, Congress considered lifting the racial qualification for naturalization. To prevent Native American and “Asiatic” naturalization, however, the statute was amended to include only white persons
and “persons of African descent.” 13 The Supreme Court later expressly
held that this excluded Japanese aliens. 14
The exclusion of Japanese from naturalization provided facially neutral euphemisms for racist state laws. State laws made citizenship a prerequisite for many occupations, including lawyers, accountants, physicians,
and even funeral directors and barbers; a federal study attributed these laws
to anti-Japanese discrimination. 15 In the early twentieth century, several
states, including California, also used the naturalization exclusion as the
basis for statutes that forbade “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from owning agricultural land. 16 All Asians were ineligible for naturalization, but
Congress had already banned Chinese immigration in 1882; thus the “Alien
Land Laws” mainly affected Japanese immigrants. The state attorney general who wrote California’s statute openly declared that it was intended to
counter “race undesirability” by discouraging Japanese immigration and

10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 26–27.
12. Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 48 (1998).
13. See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW 43–44 (2006).
14. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
15. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PEOPLE IN MOTION: THE POSTWAR ADJUSTMENT OF THE
EVACUATED
JAPANESE
AMERICANS
33
(1947),
https://ia802701.us.archive.org/4/items/peopleinmotionpo00unit/peopleinmotionpo00unit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BEN7-FRJ9].
16. Aoki, supra note 12, at 55.
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HQFRXUDJLQJ UHSDWULDWLRQ 7KH 86 6XSUHPH &RXUW QRQHWKHOHVV UHMHFWHG
(TXDO3URWHFWLRQFKDOOHQJHVWRWKHVWDWXWHLQDQG
$QWL-DSDQHVHVHQWLPHQWLQWKHHDUO\WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\SDUWLFXODUO\RQ
WKH :HVW &RDVW ZDV VR LQWHQVH WKDW LW WKUHDWHQHG WKH 86 JRYHUQPHQW¶V
DWWHPSWVWRHVWDEOLVKWUDGHWLHVZLWK-DSDQ$FWLQJXQGHUDVWDWHODZDXWKRU
L]LQJ WKH VHJUHJDWLRQ RI ³0RQJROLDQ´ VWXGHQWV 6DQ )UDQFLVFR HVWDEOLVKHG
VHSDUDWHVFKRROVIRU-DSDQHVHFKLOGUHQLQ7KLVWKUHDWHQHGWRVSDUND
GLSORPDWLF FULVLV 3UHVLGHQW 7KHRGRUH 5RRVHYHOW EURNHUHG D GHDO ZLWK 5H
SXEOLFDQ SROLWLFLDQV XQGHU ZKLFK &DOLIRUQLD ZRXOG GLVFRXUDJH VHJUHJDWLRQ
LQ H[FKDQJH IRU IHGHUDO UHVWULFWLRQV RQ -DSDQHVH LPPLJUDWLRQ 5RRVHYHOW
WKHQ QHJRWLDWHG WKH VRFDOOHG ³*HQWOHPDQ¶V $JUHHPHQW´ XQGHU ZKLFK -D
SDQ LQIRUPDOO\ DJUHHG WR OLPLW HPLJUDWLRQ WR WKH 86 7KH *HQWOHPHQ¶V
$JUHHPHQWZDVSHUFHLYHGDVWRROHQLHQWKRZHYHUDQGWULJJHUHGDQDWLYLVW
EDFNODVK &RQJUHVV DGRSWLQJ &DOLIRUQLD¶V DQWL-DSDQHVH HXSKHPLVP VXE
VHTXHQWO\EDQQHGLPPLJUDWLRQE\DQ\³DOLHQVLQHOLJLEOHIRUFLWL]HQVKLS´LQ

'XULQJ :RUOG :DU ,, WKH 86 JRYHUQPHQW LQFDUFHUDWHG SHUVRQV RI
-DSDQHVHGHVFHQWHQPDVVHEDVHGRQWKHQRWLRQWKDWDOOSHUVRQVRI-DSDQHVH
GHVFHQW LQFOXGLQJ86ERUQFLWL]HQV ZHUHIRUHLJQHQHPLHV'LVOR\DOW\WR
WKH86ZDVQRWDPDWWHURISROLWLFDOLGHQWLW\EXWDQLQKHUHQWUDFLDOFKDUDF
WHULVWLF$FFRUGLQJWR*HQHUDO-RKQ'H:LWWZKRRYHUVDZWKHH[FOXVLRQRI
-DSDQHVH$PHULFDQVIURPWKH:HVW&RDVW³7KH-DSDQHVHUDFHLVDQHQHP\
UDFHDQGZKLOHPDQ\VHFRQGDQGWKLUGJHQHUDWLRQ-DSDQHVHERUQRQ8QLWHG
6WDWHV VRLO SRVVHVVHG RI 8QLWHG 6WDWHV FLWL]HQVKLS KDYH EHFRPH µ$PHUL
FDQL]HG¶ WKH UDFLDO VWUDLQV DUH XQGLOXWHG´ &DOLIRUQLD $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO
DQG ODWHU 6XSUHPH &RXUW &KLHI -XVWLFH  (DUO :DUUHQ LQVLVWHG WKDW PDVV
LQFDUFHUDWLRQZDVQHFHVVDU\EHFDXVHLWZDVLPSRVVLEOHWRPDNHLQGLYLGXDO
GHWHUPLQDWLRQV DERXW WKH OR\DOW\ RI -DSDQHVH DOLHQV RU -DSDQHVH $PHUL
FDQV ,QGLYLGXDO GHWHUPLQDWLRQV FRXOG EH PDGH IRU SHUVRQV RI ,WDOLDQ RU



 (GZLQ()HUJXVRQThe California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment&$/
/5(9Q  

 :HEEY2¶%ULHQ86  3RUWHUILHOGY:HEE86  

 $RNLsupra QRWHDW

 (5,&<$0$0272(7$/5$&(5,*+76$1'5(3$5$7,21±  

 See 7KRPDV : -RR Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the
Construction of Race Before and After September 11&2/80+80576/5(9±  

 +RKULY8QLWHG6WDWHV)G '&&LU vacated86  

 /(2.$7&+(5($5/:$55(1$32/,7,&$/%,2*5$3+<  
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German descent, however, because they “are no different from anybody
else.” 24
Many Japanese Americans returned to California after their release
from the concentration camps. 25 They were met with a “wave of terrorism.” 26 One author claimed “seventy . . . instances of terrorism and nineteen shootings” took place in the first half of 1945; another cited “thirtyone major terrorist attacks.” 27 Violence was particularly severe in California’s Central Valley, the inland portion of the state that includes the Sacramento area. 28 Crimes included “nightrider incidents” and guns fired at
homes. In 1945, while Sumio Doi was serving in France with the famed
442nd Infantry Regiment, someone attempted to dynamite a building on his
parents’ ranch and fired a shotgun at the family’s home. A Sacramento
court acquitted the two suspects as a crowd of about one hundred
cheered. 29
During World War II, the naturalization privilege had been extended
to immigrants from America’s Asian allies, China, India, and the Philippines. Japanese immigrants, however, remained excluded until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Until then, Alien Land laws still
applied to Japanese immigrants in California and other states. California
enforced its Alien Land Law less aggressively in the 1930s, but stepped up
enforcement when internees began returning from the camps. 30 By spring
1946, approximately fifty enforcement actions were pending, all involving
persons of Japanese descent. 31
Racism also infected residential real estate. Racially restrictive covenants had become popular in Sacramento and other cities in the 1920s, 32
limiting minority homeowners to the West End and other, older neighborhoods that lacked such covenants. 33 In Sacramento, a typical covenant prohibited ownership or occupancy by a “Negro, Japanese or Chinese, [or]

24. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 71 (1982). Some German and Italian
aliens (not U.S. citizens) were interned, but only after individual loyalty hearings. See J. Gregory Sidak,
War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1416–17 (1992).
25. See WAYNE MAEDA, CHANGING DREAMS AND TREASURED MEMORIES 206 (2000); WILDIE
supra note 8, at 128.
26. Ferguson, supra note 17, at 73.
27. See MAEDA supra note 25, at 204.
28. See id. at 202–04.
29. Id.
30. Ferguson, supra note 17, at 73.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 39–40.
33. WILLIAM BURG, SACRAMENTO RENAISSANCE: ART, MUSIC & ACTIVISM IN CALIFORNIA’S
CAPITAL CITY 28 (2013) ; MAEDA, supra note 25, at 206.
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person of African or Mongolian descent.” 34 Beginning in the 1930s, FHA
loan approval guidelines restricted loans only to whites and required restrictive covenants as a condition of loan approval. 35 Racially restrictive
covenants were legally enforceable until 1948, 36 more than long enough for
them to influence the housing patterns in place at the time of urban renewal
in the 1950s. Furthermore, even when the Court declared restrictive covenants unenforceable, it could not erase them from existing deeds. 37
Moreover, even after restrictive covenants became unenforceable, private housing discrimination remained lawful and pervasive. Many Sacramento-area landlords refused to rent to Japanese-Americans, and real estate
agents steered them away from white neighborhoods. 38 Lenders in Sacramento appear to have followed the FHA’s racially discriminatory lending
guidelines. 39 The FHA refused to insure integrated real estate projects until
1949, but even after that it continued to insure segregated projects as
well. 40 In 1958, a Sacramento trial court found that “Negroes have been
and are turned away from original sales of most tract homes in the area.” 41
When a 1963 California statute banned housing discrimination, voters nullified it by approving a state constitutional amendment sponsored by the
real estate and construction industries. 42 The California Supreme Court
then invalidated that amendment on Equal Protection grounds, and the U.S.
Supreme Court finally agreed in 1967. 43
B. Sacramento’s Japantown
Sacramento’s first Japanese-owned businesses were a hotel and boarding houses opened in 1891 to house Japanese laborers (whom white-owned
34. See MAEDA, supra note 25, at 206.
35. See MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN
AMERICA, 1933–1965, at 41 (1975).
36. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
37. RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 3 (2013).
38. BURG, supra note 33, at 29; MAEDA, supra note 25, at 207.
39. Jesus Hernandez, Race, Market Constraints, and the Housing Crisis: A Problem of Embeddedness, KALFOU, Fall 2014, at 29, 41.
40. GELFAND, supra note 35, at 220–21.
41. See Ming v. Horgan, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 693 (Vanderbilt Univ. Sch. of Law) (Cal. Super. Ct.
1958). Although the defendants in Ming were private developers, the court found their discrimination
was unconstitutional because the development had received FHA and Veterans Administration mortgage insurance, an unusual and controversial result at the time. See Anne W. Branscomb, An Analysis of
Attempts to Prohibit Racial Discrimination in the Sale and Rental of Publicly Assisted Private Housing,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 758, 765 (1958).
42. See CLARENCE Y.H. LO, SMALL PROPERTY VERSUS BIG GOVERNMENT: SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT 122 (1990).
43. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967).
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hotels would not accept). 44 By 1909, the city had over 200 Japanese-owned
businesses. 45 According to a contemporaneous Japanese source, there were
471 such businesses in 1941. 46 The Japanese community of urban Sacramento was largely contained in and around the six-block Japantown neighborhood. 47 Most business owners lived in the same building as their
business premises. 48 A Japanese residential neighborhood grew up around
the commercial center of Japantown. 49 The diverse range of businesses in
Japantown—stores, restaurants, pool halls, medical and dental practices,
banks and newspapers—allowed the community to be largely selfsufficient, and many residents rarely left the immediate neighborhood. 50
Japantown was located in the city’s so-called West End, the older part
of the city that included its Gold Rush-era birthplace on the bank of the
Sacramento River. 51 The city’s newer neighborhoods had grown to the east,
away from the river. By the mid-twentieth century, the West End was a
“highly integrated interracial area.” 52 A 1952 report analyzed businesses in
a twelve-block portion of the West End, including two blocks of Japantown. About half the businesses in this zone were owned by whites, and
half by “non-Caucasians and Mexicans.” 53 When Japanese Americans were
incarcerated during World War II, many black-owned businesses moved
into the area. Club Zanzibar, a black-owned nightclub on Capitol Avenue,
hosted world-class performers in the 1940s, including Dizzy Gillespie and
Duke Ellington. 54 Nearby was a predominantly Mexican-American neighborhood 55 and a Spanish-speaking Catholic church. 56
Urban renewal completely dispersed the West End’s diverse population and replaced small businesses and residences with large-scale commercial development. The census tract covering half of Sacramento’s first
urban renewal area and including most of Japantown 57 had 4467 residents
44. MAEDA, supra note 25, at 117.
45. Id. at 119; WILDIE supra note 8, at 32, 119.
46. MAEDA, supra note 25, at 137.
47. WILDIE, supra note 8, at 29.
48. Id. at 38.
49. MAEDA, supra note 25, at 135.
50. Id. at 118–33; WILDIE, supra note 8, at 31.
51. WILDIE, supra note 8, at 29.
52. HAROLD F. WISE, SACRAMENTO REDEV. AGENCY, SURVEY OF BUSINESS IN SACRAMENTO’S
WEST END 1 (1951) (CCMR Box 122).
53. Id. at 6.
54. See William Burg, Sacramento’s Bourbon Street, GOLDEN NUGGETS, Mar. 2012, at 3.
55. See WILDIE, supra note 8; BURG, supra, note 33, at 24.
56. BURG, supra note 33, at 24.
57. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BULL. P-D46, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950, CENSUS TRACT
STATISTICS: SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA AND ADJACENT AREA 7 tbl. 1 (1952) [hereinafter 1950 CENSUS

1012

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 92:3

in 1950, 1299 in 1960, and a mere 377 in 1970. 58 Home to 58,000 people
in 1950, central Sacramento had only 27,000 by 1970. 59
III. URBAN RENEWAL LAW
A. State Law
Although urban renewal is generally thought of as a federal program,
it actually involved all levels of government: a federal statute provided
funding for locally controlled redevelopment projects that were authorized
by state statutes. This multilevel structure was envisioned by the National
Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB, the predecessor of today’s
National Association of Realtors). 60 In 1941, NAREB drafted a legislative
proposal under which states would empower local agencies to acquire land
by eminent domain, clear it of structures and install infrastructure, then
resell it to private developers at a loss. The federal government would in
turn partially subsidize those losses. 61 NAREB argued that the redeveloped
land would eventually appreciate in value, benefiting developers and increasing property-tax revenues for local governments. 62
The real-estate industry saw its locally controlled, public-private partnership model come into being over the next several years. State legislatures soon began passing laws establishing and empowering the required
local agencies. California’s 1945 Community Redevelopment Law (CRL) 63
was among the first such acts. Following the NAREB model, the CRL and
many other state statutes gave quasi-governmental local agencies (“rede-

TRACTS]; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PHC(1)–129, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: 1960,
CENSUS TRACTS: SACRAMENTO, CALIF. 13 (1962) [hereinafter 1960 CENSUS TRACTS]; U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, PHC(1)–178, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: 1970, CENSUS TRACTS:
SACRAMENTO, CALIF., at VII tbl. A (1972) [hereinafter 1970 CENSUS TRACTS].
58. Population figures for Tracts 7 and 8 are from 1950 CENSUS TRACTS, supra note 57, at 7,
1960 CENSUS TRACTs, supra note 57 at 15, and 1970 CENSUS TRACTS, supra note 57, at P-6 and X.
59. William Burg, Where Did the Downtown Population Go?, SACRAMENTO PRESS (Jan. 2,
2013),
http://sacramentopress.com/2013/01/02/where-did-the-downtown-population-go/
[https://perma.cc/D693-BE4L].
60. History of the National Association of Realtors, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS (Sept. 20, 2017),
http://www.realtor.org/field-guides/field-guide-to-the-history-of-the-national-association-of-realtors.
[https://perma.cc/6VPS-7A5Z].
61. See Jefferson B. Fordham, Urban Redevelopment, 10 OHIO ST. L. J. 414, 416 (1949);
GELFAND, supra note 35, at 115–117.
62. See GELFAND, supra note 35, at 115–17.
63. More precisely, California passed the Community Redevelopment Act in 1945, see Stats.
1945, ch. 1326, p. 2478 (July 11, 1945), and codified it in 1951, as the Community Redevelopment
Law, see Stats. 1951, ch. 710, p. 1923 (1951) (codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 33000–33855
(1951)) [hereinafter CRL]. For convenience, this Article will refer to the statute as the “California
Redevelopment Law” and cite the codified version.
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RUGHU WR FRPEDW D YDJXHO\GHVFULEHG VFRXUJH FDOOHG ³EOLJKW´ 5DWKHU WKDQ
GHILQH³EOLJKW´WKH&5/OLNHPDQ\RWKHUVWDWHVWDWXWHVJDYHDORQJOLVWRI
IDFWRUVWKDW³FKDUDFWHUL]HG´EOLJKWQRQHRIZKLFKZHUHHLWKHUQHFHVVDU\RU
VXIILFLHQW7KHIDFWRUVGLVSOD\HGDZLGHUDQJHRIVXEMHFWLYHQRWLRQVDERXW
LPSURSHUGHYHORSPHQWDQGODQGXVHVXFKDV³PL[HGFKDUDFWHURUVKLIWLQJRI
XVHV´ ³HFRQRPLF GLVORFDWLRQRU GLVXVH UHVXOWLQJ IURP IDXOW\ SODQ
QLQJ´ DQG ODFN RI GHYHORSPHQW GXH WR EHLQJ VXEGLYLGHG 7KH OLVW RI
IDFWRUV FOHDUO\ WDUJHWHG ORZYDOXH UHVLGHQFHV DQG VPDOO EXVLQHVVHV E\ LQ
FOXGLQJ ³XQSURGXFWLYH´ ODQG XVH ³GHSUHFLDWHG YDOXHV´ DQG ³WD[ UHFHLSWV
>WKDW@DUHLQDGHTXDWHIRUWKHFRVWRISXEOLFVHUYLFHVUHQGHUHG´
7KH&5/JDYHORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVFRQWURORYHUSODQQLQJSURYLGHGRQ
O\ WKDW WKH\ FRPSOLHG ZLWK IRUPDOLVWLF SURFHGXUDO UHTXLUHPHQWV LQFOXGLQJ
GUDIWLQJ WHQWDWLYH SODQV KROGLQJ SXEOLF KHDULQJV DQG ILOLQJ ILQDO SODQV
%RWK WKH WHQWDWLYH DQG ILQDO ³SODQV´ FRXOG EH YHU\ JHQHUDO WKH\ ZHUH QRW
UHTXLUHG WR GHVFULEH DQ\ SDUWLFXODU SURSRVHG EXLOGLQJV RU XVHV QRU ZHUH
WKH\UHTXLUHGWRLQFOXGHDQ\SDUWLFXODUW\SHVRIVWUXFWXUHVRUXVHV VXFKDV
KRXVLQJIRULQVWDQFH 
7KH &5/ GLG QRW UHTXLUH ORFDO 5'$V WR KHOS GLVSODFHG UHVLGHQWV RU
EXVLQHVVHVILQGQHZTXDUWHUV,WPHUHO\UHTXLUHGORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVWRPDNH
D ILQGLQJ WKDW FRPSDUDEOH UHSODFHPHQW DFFRPPRGDWLRQV ³DUH RU ZLOO EH
PDGHDYDLODEOH´,QSUDFWLFHWKLVSHUPLVVLYHODQJXDJHZDVWDNHQOLWHUDOO\
LQLWVSODQVWRGHPROLVK-DSDQWRZQ6DFUDPHQWRVLPSO\PDGH DSURIRUPD
GHFODUDWLRQWKDWKRXVLQJZDVDYDLODEOHHOVHZKHUHLQWKHPHWURSROLWDQDUHD



 7KH&5/GLGQRWLQFOXGHDQDFWXDOGHILQLWLRQRI³EOLJKW´XQWLO6WHZDUW%ODFNRedevelopment in California: Its Past, Present and Possible Future&$/ - 32/  32/¶<±
 
%URDGGHILQLWLRQVUHPDLQDQLVVXHLQPDQ\VWDWHV¶UHGHYHORSPHQWODZVSee&ROLQ*RUGRQBlighting the
Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight  )25'+$0
85%$1/-  

 See&5/±

 See&5/

 See&5/

 See&5/

 Id. ³(YHU\UHGHYHORSPHQWSODQVKDOOVKRZ D 7KHDPRXQWRIRSHQVSDFHWREHSURYLGHGDQG
VWUHHWOD\RXW>@ E /LPLWDWLRQVRQW\SHVL]HKHLJKWQXPEHUDQGSURSRVHGXVHRIEXLOGLQJV>@ F 7KH
QXPEHURIGZHOOLQJXQLWV>@ G 7KHSURSHUW\WREHGHYRWHGWRSXEOLFSXUSRVHVDQGWKHQDWXUHRIVXFK
SXUSRVHV>@ H 2WKHUFRYHQDQWVFRQGLWLRQVDQGUHVWULFWLRQVZKLFKWKHOHJLVODWLYHERG\SUHVFULEHV´ 

 &5/   ,I DQ\ ORZLQFRPH WHQDQWV ZHUH WR EH GLVSODFHG D ORFDO JRYHUQPHQW ZDV UH
TXLUHG WR ³REWDLQ DQG FRQVLGHU´ EXW QRW QHFHVVDULO\ IROORZ  UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV IURP ORFDO KRXVLQJ
DXWKRULW\FRQFHUQLQJWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIUHSODFHPHQWKRXVLQJ&5/

 See6$&5$0(172 5('(9 $*(1&< 352-(&7 $ ),1$/ 3/$1 5(3257   RQILOHZLWK
WKH&HQWHUIRU6DFUDPHQWR+LVWRU\&LW\&RXQFLO0LQXWHVDQG5HFRUGV%R[)ROGHU 
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B. Federal Law: The Housing Act of 1949
$ IHZ \HDUV DIWHU WKH &5/ WKH +RXVLQJ $FW RI  LQWURGXFHG WKH
IHGHUDOVXEVLGLHV1$5(%KDGHQYLVLRQHG%\WKHQWZHQW\VHYHQVWDWHVKDG
DGRSWHGUHGHYHORSPHQWVWDWXWHV:LWKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIIHGHUDODLGHYHQ
PRUHVWDWHVSDVVHGVXFKVWDWXWHV DQG UHGHYHORSPHQW DFWLYLW\EHJDQLQHDU
QHVW7KHFHQWHUSLHFHRIWKH+RXVLQJ$FWRIZDVWKHDXWKRUL]DWLRQRI
IXQGLQJIRUSXEOLFKRXVLQJIRUWKHILUVW WLPH VLQFHWKH1HZ 'HDO HUD7KH
VXEVLGLHVWR5'$VLQ7LWOH,RIWKH$FWZHUHOHVVQRWLFHGDWWKHWLPH7KLV
SDUWRIWKHVWDWXWHHQWLWOHG³6OXP&OHDUDQFHDQG&RPPXQLW\'HYHORSPHQW
DQG5HGHYHORSPHQW´ZDVUHQDPHG³6OXP&OHDUDQFHDQG8UEDQ5HQHZDO´
LQWKHYHUVLRQRIWKH$FW7LWOH,LGHQWLILHGWKHHOLPLQDWLRQRI³VOXPV´
DQG ³EOLJKWHG´ DUHDV DV D SROLF\ JRDO EXW PDGH QR DWWHPSW WR H[SODLQ
WKRVHWHUPV
7LWOH , LPSRVHG QR PHDQLQJIXO SODQQLQJ UHTXLUHPHQWV RQ ORFDO DJHQ
FLHV1RUGLGLWJLYHWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWDQ\VLJQLILFDQWUROHLQSODQ
QLQJ /RFDO DXWKRULWLHV KDG EURDG VWDWXWRU\ GLVFUHWLRQ WR GHVLJQDWHDQ DUHD
IRU ³UHGHYHORSPHQW´ /LNH WKH UHGHYHORSPHQW VWDWXWHV RI &DOLIRUQLD DQG
RWKHUVWDWHV7LWOH,GLGQRWGHILQH³UHGHYHORSPHQW´1RUGLGLWSUHVFULEH
DQ\VXEVWDQWLYHHOHPHQWVRIUHGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWV/LNHWKH&5/7LWOH,
UHTXLUHGORFDODJHQFLHVWRKROGDSXEOLFKHDULQJEHIRUHDFWLQJEXWGLGQRW
UHTXLUH WKH DJHQF\ WR UHVSRQG WR DQ\ FRQFHUQV UDLVHG DW WKH KHDULQJ  $
ORFDOJRYHUQPHQWKDGWRIRUPXODWHD³UHGHYHORSPHQWSODQ´EXWWKHVWDWXWH
UHTXLUHGRQO\WKDWWKHSODQ³LQGLFDWHLWVUHODWLRQVKLSWRGHILQLWHORFDOREMHF
WLYHV´ DQG ³LQGLFDWH SURSRVHG ODQG XVHV´ ,Q NHHSLQJ ZLWK 1$5(%¶V YL
VLRQDQGWKHVWDWHVWDWXWRU\VFKHPHV7LWOH,OLPLWHGWKHJRYHUQPHQWUROHWR
WDNLQJ SURSHUW\ DQG VXEVLGL]LQJ LWV WUDQVIHU WR WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU 7LWOH ,
H[SUHVVO\ DLPHG WR SURYLGH ³PD[LPXP RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU WKH UHGHYHORSPHQW
RISURMHFWDUHDVE\SULYDWHHQWHUSULVH´
7KHVWDWXWHQRPLQDOO\UHTXLUHGORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVWRKDYH³DIHDVLEOH
PHWKRGIRUWKHWHPSRUDU\UHORFDWLRQRIIDPLOLHVGLVSODFHGIURPWKHSURMHFW
DUHD´DQGWRILQGWKDW³GHFHQWVDIHDQGVDQLWDU\GZHOOLQJV´ZHUHDYDLODEOH


 See )RUGKDPsupraQRWHDW

 +RXVLQJ$FWRI3XE/1R D  D  F 6WDW

 See'DQLHO50DQGHONHUThe Comprehensive Plan in Urban Renewal8 3$ / 5(9
  

 +RXVLQJ$FWRI D 

 7KHGHILQLWLRQVVHFWLRQRI7LWOH,VWDWHVRQO\WKDW³µUHGHYHORSPHQW¶VKDOOPHDQGHYHORSDV
ZHOODVUHGHYHORS´Id. F 

 Id. G 

 Id. E 

 Id. D 

2017]

URBAN RENEWAL

1015

for displaced families. 81 As with the CRL’s relocation provisions, however,
these requirements had no enforcement or verification provisions and could
apparently be satisfied by mere declarations that alternative housing existed. 82 Cities that did prepare relocation plans often ignored them. 83
IV. URBAN RENEWAL IN SACRAMENTO
A. Redevelopment Area No. 1
Soon after the passage of Title I, Sacramento adopted an ordinance
designating sixty-two blocks of the West End as “Redevelopment Area No.
1.” 84 The area included all of Japantown. The redevelopment designation
was based on “substandard dwelling units, depreciated land values . . . deterioration of buildings, unhealthful living conditions, [and] disproportionate expenditures for crime prevention and correction and for
other protection of the public health and safety.” While the city’s Planning
Commission had conducted studies before the passage of the ordinance, it
filed no reports with the city council until several months later. Property
owners thus challenged the ordinance in court, arguing that it had designated the Redevelopment Area without evidentiary basis. A state appeals court
gave generous deference to the Sacramento City Council, however. 85 Although there was no proof that the council had reviewed the unfiled survey
results before passing the ordinance, the court held “it may be reasonably
assumed.” 86
The commission did not state how it chose the boundaries of the sixtytwo-block Redevelopment Area. The SRA later claimed that the Planning
Commission had found Redevelopment Area No. 1 to be “the most blighted section of the city.” 87 But the commission had not surveyed the entire
city, and its reports focused on documenting “blight” in the West End, not

81. Id. § 105(c).
82. See, e.g., SACRAMENTO REDEV. AGENCY, REPORT NO. 3, REDEVELOPMENT IN
SACRAMENTO’S WEST END: REPORT OF TENTATIVE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN, PROJECT AREA NO. 1
(1953) [hereinafter PROJECT 1 TENTATIVE PLAN REPORT] (on file with the Center for Sacramento
History, City Council Minutes and Records, Box 132, Folder: 4/30/1953).
83. GELFAND, supra note 35, at 211–12.
84. Sacramento, Cal., Ordinance 1480 (Feb. 3, 1950) (A searchable database of historical Sacramento ordinances is available online at http://records.cityofsacramento.org/).
85. See generally Redev. Agency of City of Sacramento v. Modell, 177 Cal. App. 2d 321 (1960).
86. Id. at 325.
87. Memorandum, Sacramento Redev. Agency, The Meaning of Redevelopment (c. 1954) [hereinafter The Meaning of Redevelopment] (on file with the Center for Sacramento History, City Council
Minutes and Records, Box 141, Folder: 1/28/1954).
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on comparing it to other parts of town. 88 According to the commission’s
own studies, the area to the northeast of Redevelopment Area No. 1, known
as Alkali Flat, 89 had a greater prevalence of substandard housing, a similar
rate of decline in property values, and a similar degree of mixed use. 90
The Redevelopment Area was a large and diverse area. Although it included some dilapidated buildings, it included a variety of neighborhoods
and structures. 91 One local real estate agent opined in 1954, “I don’t think
the Redevelopment Law was made for a city like Sacramento. I don’t think
we have slums here.” 92 According to a leading local historian, the West
End was beginning to “regenerate” in the early 1950s, and “redevelopment
reports ignored its true condition.” 93 “Characterizations of the neighborhood as the worst slum in the western United States,” he argues, “do not
match the photographs or descriptions of the neighborhood.” 94
B. Urban Renewal Begins: Project 2-A
In 1951, the Sacramento RDA (known as the SRA) informed the local
chapter of the Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL) that it had begun making plans for Redevelopment Area No. 1. 95 JACL leaders offered
to discuss planning with the SRA, but received no response. 96 In 1953, the
SRA released plans for its first intended redevelopment project. It was located several blocks away from Japantown, suggesting that the neighborhood would be spared, at least for the time being. 97 In 1954, however, the
SRA abandoned the original project without warning and announced its
plans to begin urban renewal with the demolition of Japantown. 98 The new
project covered a fifteen-block zone referred to as Project 2-A. It included
most of Japantown and parts of the adjoining African-American and Mexican-American neighborhoods. Nearly two-thirds of area residents were
88. See RICHARD J. NEUTRA ET AL., REDEVELOPMENT FACTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1950),
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000343536 [https://perma.cc/TPB3-2GXV] [hereinafter MAY 1950
REPORT].
89. See BURG, supra note 33.
90. See MAY 1950 REPORT, supra note 88, at 17, 13, 19.
91. See BURG, supra note 33; see also Hearings on Tentative Redevelopment Plan for Project 2A, pt. 1, at 63–64 (Sacramento, Cal. 1954) [hereinafter Project 2-A Hearings] (on file with the Center
for Sacramento History, City Council Minutes and Records, Box 146, Folder: 6/29/1954) (comments of
W. P. Wright, saying the area was a mix of “nice” houses and dilapidated ones).
92. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 37 (comments of W. P. Wright).
93. See BURG, supra note 33, at 39–40.
94. See id.
95. See Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 2, at 79 (comments of Mamoru Sakuma).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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people of color: of its 3883 residents, 1386 were classified as “White,” 800
as “Negro,” and 1697—a plurality—as members of “Other races.” 99 The
announcement took the community by surprise. Local residents and merchants quickly formed the Japanese-American Redevelopment Study Association (JARSA). JARSA attempted to represent the neighborhood by
electing area property owners, business owners and residents as its officers
and board members. 100
As noted above, Redevelopment Area No. 1 was not necessarily the
most deteriorated part of the city. Nor was Project 2-A the worst part of
Area No. 1. An earlier SRA report had described a portion of Redevelopment Area No. 1, none of which included Japantown, as its “welldefined . . . slum area.” 101 That twelve-block area extending inland from
the riverbank had experienced the worst declines in property value and the
worst rates of tuberculosis and crime in Redevelopment Area No. 1.102
Project 2-A included only three of those blocks, however. At the hearings,
many residents and business owners argued that Japantown had been unfairly singled out, and was in no worse condition than other parts of
town. 103 A local real estate agent insisted that “there’s just as good houses
here as there is in . . . any other part of Sacramento.” 104 New construction
was in progress and new businesses were opening in the neighborhood. 105
Even SRA director Jerome Lipp acknowledged that Project 2-A did
not include the worst conditions in the redevelopment area. 106 He advanced
the dubious explanation that starting redevelopment at the river and moving
eastward would spread slums and blight into the central city, while starting
inland and moving west would “drive it into the river.” 107 City and SRA
officials used a different metaphor, claiming Project 2-A would create “a
barrier” 108 to “seal off the blight of the West End.” 109
99. SACRAMENTO REDEV. AGENCY, PROPOSED PROJECT NO. 2-A: REPORT ON RESULT OF
SURVEYS TO MEASURE CONDITIONS OF SLUM AND BLIGHT (1953) (on file with the Center for Sacramento History, City of Sacramento Planning Dep’t, Box: Final City Report 1929; West End Reports
1929–1959, Folder: 2009/008/002).
100. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 11–12.
101. PROJECT 1 TENTATIVE PLAN REPORT, supra note 82, at 3.
102. MAY 1950 REPORT, supra note 88, at 13, 17.
103. See, e.g., Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 3, at 64–65 (testimony of Elsie Modell); id.
at 71–72 (testimony of Toko Fujii).
104. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 3, at 37–38 (testimony of W. P. Wright).
105. Id. at 36 (testimony of Felix Flowers); id. at 35 (testimony of Sal Gomez); WILDIE, supra note
8, at 127–32.
106. WILDIE, supra note 8, at 145 (quoting his interview with Lipp).
107. Id.
108. Sacramento City Council, Minutes, Special Meeting 343 (Sept. 11, 1952); SACRAMENTO
CITY COUNCIL, REPORT NO. 3, at 11 (1953).
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The decision to begin urban renewal with the destruction of Japantown, rather than focusing on more deteriorated areas, indicates the real
priorities of urban renewal in the 1950s. Its goal was not to improve urban
conditions per se, but to increase inner-city property values and tax receipts. Urban renewal thus destroyed many functioning neighborhoods
whose central locations made them attractive to commercial redevelopment. More deteriorated areas often went untouched if they were unsuited
for such redevelopment. 110
Japantown was in the part of the West End furthest from the deteriorated river area. But it was also the part closest to valuable real estate: the
existing central business district (CBD) and the state Capitol grounds. 111
Capitol Avenue, the city’s central thoroughfare at the time, passes through
the West End from the river to the state Capitol grounds. For decades, city
leaders had lamented deteriorating conditions in the area and envisioned a
grand approach to the Capitol that would inspire civic pride. 112 Detailed
plans for a beautified Capitol Mall were proposed in the 1920s and 1930s,
but were never realized due to lack of funds. 113 According to a 1953 report,
the CBD needed to expand in order to compete with suburban shopping
centers; this would require “making over part of the area.” 114 By the late
1950s, Sacramento’s “peak-value intersection” (the street corner with the
highest land value) was located in the CBD just east of the Redevelopment
Area. Over time, the peak-value location had been moving eastward—out
of and away from the West End.115 According to the Planning Commission,
redevelopment of the blocks west of the CBD would halt this trend.116 Urban renewal eventually replaced the modest homes and small businesses of
the area with a Macy’s department store and shopping center, a block-sized
federal office building, and large private office buildings. 117
109. SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL, supra note 108.
110. GELFAND, supra note 35, at 208.
111. The Grand Approach: Sacramento’s Capitol Mall, PAR ENVTL. SERVS.,
http://www.parenvironmental.com/assets/articles/The-Grand-Approach-Sacramentos-Capitol-Mall.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JTA-SMGF]; STEVEN M. AVELLA, SACRAMENTO: INDOMITABLE CITY 128 (2003).
112. The Grand Approach: Sacramento’s Capitol Mall, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. HAROLD F. WISE, REPORT NO. 4, ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL EXPANSION (1953)
(on file with Center for Sacramento History, Box: Final City Report 1929; West End Reports 1929–
1959, Folder: 2009/008/003).
115. SACRAMENTO CITY PLANNING COMM’N, A GENERAL PLAN FOR SACRAMENTO 12 (1959) (on
file with Center for Sacramento History, Box: Final City Report 1929; West End Reports 1929–1959,
Folder: 2009/008).
116. Id.
117. See SACRAMENTO HOUSING & REDEV. AGENCY, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT (1980) [hereinafter
SHRA 1980].
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The RDA filed plans for the redevelopment of Project 2-A, as required
by the CRL. As permitted by the statute, however, both the so-called “Tentative” (i.e., initial) and later “Final” plans lacked specifics. They stated in
general terms that the SRA planned to acquire the land, clear it, close some
streets to car traffic, supply infrastructure and, finally, lease or sell the land.
They did not specify which buildings would be torn down, or what or how
many buildings would be constructed. They merely stated, in very broad
terms, the proposed use patterns for each block or portion of a block. As
attorney Mamoru Sakuma complained at the time, “the [T]entative [P]lan is
no plan, because nothing is indicated. It is all . . . ‘the details will be
worked out,’ but I don’t see any master plan at all.” 118 The report on the
Final Plan for the fifteen blocks of Project 2-A was similarly general. It
designated 3 ½ blocks for “general commercial” use, 4 ½ blocks for “public buildings/special commercial,”4 ¾ blocks for “multiple residential,” 1 ¼
blocks for “convenience shopping” and one block for parking. 119 The plan
specified no actual buildings and set no limits on the size or number of
buildings.
The sketchiness of redevelopment plans followed from Title I’s design, under which redevelopment projects consisted of the government
acquiring land, clearing it, and installing roads and basic infrastructure.
Only after completion would developers decide whether to purchase the
land and what to construct on it. Thus the so-called “plans” were really
planners’ aspirations and did not represent construction proposals. Although the acquisition of land in Project 2-A began in 1956, the first reconstruction project did not commence until 1959. 120 Indeed, after the city
approved a “Final Plan” in 1955, it remained unclear for years what would
be built on the site. A 1961 report listed definite construction projects on
only nine of the area’s fifteen blocks. 121 The “convenience shopping”
shown in the Final Plan never materialized. 122 SRA reports promised a
large hotel for years, 123 but none was ever built. 124
118. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 2, at 75.
119. See Land Use Map, in PROJECT 2-A FINAL PLAN REPORT, supra note 72.
120. SR 1961, supra note 1, at 10; SHRA 1980, supra note 117, at 43; First Pay Dirt is Struck in
Sacramento West End, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 1959. The federal government leased the building
from its private developers and later took ownership; it still serves as a federal office building today.
See Edward H. Dickson, Moss Pushes US Agency on Mall Building, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 16, 1954
at 19; SR 1961, supra note 1, at 10–11.
121. See SR 1961, supra note 1; Land Use Map, supra note 119 .
122. See JRP HISTORICAL CONSULTING, LLC, HISTORICAL RESOURCE INVENTORY AND
EVALUATION REPORT 51–52.
123. See SR 1961, supra note 1; SACRAMENTO REDEV. AGENCY, SACRAMENTO REDEVELOPMENT,
MAY 1959 (1959) (on file with the University of California at Davis, Shields Library Special Collections).
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C. Opposition and Impact on the Community
Citizen involvement in urban renewal planning tended to be “ritualistic rather than substantive.” 125 The rights of owners to participate were
limited to attending statutorily required public hearings, negotiating the
sale (or condemnation) of their properties, and competing to purchase land
at resale. 126 When Project 2-A was announced, Japanese Americans and
other neighborhood residents attempted to participate more actively in the
planning process. They were excluded from the initial planning, however,
and their later concerns were largely ignored.
Although the statutorily-required public hearings did not affect the
course of redevelopment, they show that community opposition was vociferous and organized, and that the city and the SRA were well aware of it
when they chose to proceed as planned.
The City Council originally scheduled only one public hearing on the
Project 2-A Tentative Plan, in June 1954. 127 Due to the large turnout at the
first hearing, however, two additional sessions were added and the hearings
extended into July. 128 Based on the transcripts, the “hearings” appear to
have been relatively informal town-hall style meetings. Community members were well-informed and organized in their opposition. The majority of
those speaking against the redevelopment plan were Japanese Americans. 129 Organized opposition also included thirty-two business and property owners. They retained the prominent African-American civil rights
attorney Nathaniel Colley to represent them at the hearings. 130 Colley’s
Japanese-American law partner, Mamoru Sakuma (who later became a
state judge) also appeared. 131
As a representative of the NAACP pointed out, at the hearings, the
burden of redeveloping Project 2-A would fall on “certain ethnic
groups.” 132 Sixty-one percent of homes in Project 2-A were owned by
124. See SHRA 1980, supra note 117, at 43 (listing construction projects in Project 2-A).
125. GELFAND, supra note 35, at 210.
126. See, e.g., Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, § 105(d), 63 Stat. 413; CRL §, 33733; see
also Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 2, at 87 (comments of SRA Executive Director Joseph T.
Bill, stating that owners can bid to purchase cleared properties from the SRA, but “no one could guarantee the same property back to an owner.”).
127. See Sacramento City Council, Minutes, Special Meeting 236 (June 15, 1954).
128. Bert Vaughn, Redevelopment Plan Hearing Is Put Over, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 16, 1954 at
A1; Sacramento City Council, Minutes, Special Meeting (June 29, 1954); Sacramento City Council,
Minutes, Special Meeting (July 20, 1954).
129. Vaughn, supra note 128.
130. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 3, at 22.
131. Faizah Alim, Rising to Justice, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 20, 1991.
132. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 33.
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Asians. 133 Residents who were displaced from rented homes or apartments
were unlikely to receive any compensation for lost lease value. 134 Nathaniel
Colley appeared before the City Council to ask that displaced residents be
protected from discrimination. 135 The Sacramento chapter of the NAACP
later presented the Council with a proposed ordinance that would have
prohibited discrimination in ownership, use and occupancy of real estate
anywhere in the city. 136 Instead, the council adopted a resolution prohibiting racial discrimination in use and occupancy only in redeveloped areas. 137
No such rules protected those displaced from redeveloped areas who sought
new accommodations elsewhere. Very little housing was planned for Project 2-A itself, and in any event, it was limited to upscale apartments that
would not be constructed for several years.
The SRA stated (correctly) that its only legal obligation with respect
to rehousing displaced residents was to make a finding that other housing
would be available. 138 Despite extensive and heated discussion of relocation at the hearings on the Tentative Plan, the 1955 report on the Final Plan
devoted less than one page to relocation. It simply stated, without elaboration, that alternative housing for displaced residents was available. 139 In
1964, when clearance was complete and reconstruction was under way in
Project 2-A, an SRA report stated that 499 families and 1529 individuals
had been displaced. 140 According to the report, 92 percent of the families
and 87 percent of the individuals had found new housing. The SRA
acknowledged those rates were imperfect, but claimed they were “above
the national average and should be a source of pride.” 141
While the Final Plan for Project 2-A said little about the rehousing of
residents, it did not even mention the relocation of businesses. Like its resi-

133. See Ken Lastufka, Redevelopment of Sacramento’s West End, 1950–1970: A Historical
Overview 78 (1985) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, California State University) (on file with the Center for
Sacramento History, City of Sacramento Coll., Box: Ken Lastufka MA Thesis, Folder: 2001/077/001).
134. See infra Part V.
135. Sacramento City Council, Minutes, Special Meeting 301 (July 20, 1954).
136. Sacramento City Council, Minutes 409 (Sept. 16, 1954).
137. Sacramento City Council, Minutes 468–70 (Oct. 28, 1954) (adopting Resolution 880).
138. PROJECT 1 TENTATIVE PLAN REPORT, supra note 82; see also CRL § 33738; Housing Act of
1949, Pub. L. No. 171, § 105(c) n.71, 63 Stat. 413.
139. PROJECT 2-A FINAL PLAN REPORT, supra note 72. Similarly, the SRA’s Project 1 report had
simply declared that “the high volume of construction activity in the Sacramento area,” as well as
public housing, would be sufficient to accommodate displaced persons. PROJECT 1 TENTATIVE PLAN
REPORT, supra note 82. As noted above, the Project 1 report appears to have served as a model for
subsequent reports.
140. SACRAMENTO REDEV. AGENCY, URBAN RENEWAL SACRAMENTO 8 (1964) [hereinafter URS
1964] (on file with the University of California at Davis, Shields Library Special Collections).
141. Id.

1022

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 92:3

dents, all of Project 2-A’s 350 businesses were removed by 1961. 142 The
1964 report mentioned above, which claimed success in relocating residents, stated that 808 business had been removed, but did not state how
many had found new locations. 143 The SRA repeatedly pointed out elsewhere that it had no legal obligation to assist businesses with relocation. 144
Small businesses displaced from the redevelopment area were theoretically eligible to bid on the land once it had been cleared, but they were
unlikely to have the required capital, particularly if they were renting their
business premises. 145 Federally subsidized loans were available to parties
seeking to purchase cleared land, and the SRA suggested that this program
would be useful to Japantown business owners. 146 However, the loans were
only for purchasing real estate, and not for construction. 147 Moreover, they
were aimed at very large projects: according to the SRA’s director, they
“would work better for a block or a good portion of a block rather than for
just individual property owners.” 148 Jerome Lipp explicitly stated that the
point of redevelopment was to erect “big buildings” that occupied full
blocks. 149 Thus redevelopment was effectively benefiting large outside
capital interests at the expense of small, minority-owned local businesses.
In the end, most of the projects completed in Project 2-A were large commercial buildings, such as a Macy’s department store, IBM and Wells Fargo Bank offices, and Capitol Towers, with estimated market values of well
over one million dollars each. 150 There were only a handful of relatively
small projects. 151
Despite the extended hearings and strenuous and organized resistance,
the fate of the Tentative Plan was never in serious doubt. The Council met
immediately after the last session of hearings ended on July 20, 1954. The
Council President read a prepared statement declaring “it is imperative that
the Tentative Plan be approved and that the final plan be started.” 152 The
members present voted unanimously to approve the Tentative Plan without
142. SR 1961, supra note 1, at 8.
143. URS 1964, supra note 140.
144. See, e.g., PROJECT 1 TENTATIVE PLAN REPORT, supra note 82, at 9; The Meaning of Redevelopment, supra note 87.
145. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 18 (comments of Dean Itano).
146. Loans Would Aid West End Rebuilding, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 1954, at A1.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. WILDIE, supra note 8, at 146.
150. See SHRA 1980, supra note 117, at 43.
151. See id. (listing a gas station (estimated value $159,000), the Showcase Theatre ($200,000),
and the Taketa office building ($156,000)).
152. Sacramento City Council, Minutes, Special Meeting 301 (July 20, 1954).
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changes. 153 The meeting took one hour. 154 By the end of the 1950s, almost
every existing structure in the Project 2-A area had been demolished. 155
Subsequent urban renewal projects destroyed Japantown’s remaining
blocks and much of the West End.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS ANALYSIS
The urban renewal of Japantown involved the direct taking of property
by the state from private owners. All levels of government—federal, state,
and local—took part. A state statute (the CRL) created a quasigovernmental local agency (the SRA) and empowered it to exercise eminent domain. The agency’s actions were approved by the city council and
reviewed and funded by the federal government. Using this authority and
funding, the SRA acquired almost every parcel in Project 2-A (and, later, in
surrounding neighborhoods). 156
According to the “Takings Clause” of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, the government may take private property only for “public use,” and may do so only with “just compensation” to the owner. 157 In
practice, however, the Takings Clause does little to restrict government
expropriation of property, because “public use” has been defined very
broadly and “just compensation” very narrowly. As will be argued below,
constitutional doctrine was, and remains, unable to address the harm inflicted by the Japantown takings.
A. “Public purpose”
Despite the nominal requirement of “public use,” case law gives
courts no real authority to review whether a taking satisfies this requirement. Reviewing courts must defer to government determinations in this
regard. As noted above, urban renewal was ostensibly intended to increase
tax receipts and beautify the city by subsidizing private real estate developers. The city placed these priorities above the property rights of Japantown
residents and ignored their insistence that the neighborhood was in fine
condition. No lawsuit ever challenged whether Project 2-A satisfied the
public use requirement, but decisions on similar projects established a per153. Id. at 302.
154. Id. at 301–02.
155. See SR 1961, supra note 1; The Changing Face of the City’s West End, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Jan. 1, 1959 (on file with the Center for Sacramento History, Photo Collection, Cat. No. 85/24/726).
156. URS 1964, supra note 140, at 6.
157. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 6, at 798 (many other countries have similar constitutional provisions).
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missive judicial attitude toward urban renewal. In January 1954, a California appellate court granted significant judicial deference to the CRL and to
the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency’s implementation of the statute. 158 The California supreme court declined to review the decision. 159 The
JACL’s national newspaper interpreted this as the final green light for Project 2-A. 160 By the late 1950s, redevelopment statutes had been adopted in
forty states and the District of Columbia. 161 Many of these statutes had
faced challenge in state and federal courts, and the vast majority had been
upheld. 162
Furthermore, at the end of 1954, the Supreme Court followed suit. In
Berman v. Parker, the Court upheld takings under the redevelopment statute for the District of Columbia, which closely resembled the CRL. 163 Under the statute’s authority, the D.C. Planning Commission used eminent
domain to acquire a department store in a “blighted” area with the intent of
transferring it to private real estate developers. The store itself was not
considered blighted. The owner unsuccessfully argued that taking property
for the benefit of other private parties did not serve a “public use” as required by the Fifth Amendment.
The Court disagreed, holding that a taking need not literally make
property available for use by the public; it may be justified by a “public
purpose.” But rather than examining whether D.C.’s economic redevelopment was such a purpose, the Court stated that a legislature had discretion
to choose what constituted a public purpose. A legislature could decide, for
example, that “the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” 164 A
court should not only defer to the government’s choice of purpose, but also
limit itself to an “extremely narrow” role in reviewing whether a taking
158. See Redev. Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 793, 797–99, 802, 806
(1954).
159. See id. at 777 (headnote).
160. Sac’to Nipponmachi Doomed by Capitol Redevelopment, PAC. CITIZEN, April 23, 1954, at 2
(on file with author).
161. See Eugine B. Jacobs & Jack G. Levine, Redevelopment: Making Misused and Disused Land
Available and Usable, 8 HAST. L.J. 241, 242 (1957); for examples see Note, Public Use as a Limitation
on Eminent Domain in Urban Renewal, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1436 (1955).
162. See Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d at 787–88 (citing 13 cases upholding redevelopment statutes and
two cases invalidating them); see also Note, supra note 161, at 1425. In some states, judicial invalidation of statutes prompted state constitutional amendments. Id.; Jacobs & Levine, supra note 161, at 242,
267–68.
163. 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954). By the time of Berman, similar statutes had been upheld against
takings challenges in many states, including California, where the state supreme court had declined to
review an appellate court ruling upholding the CRL. See Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d at 787–88 (citing 13
cases upholding redevelopment statutes and two cases invalidating them).
164. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
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serves that purpose. A court should further defer to the government’s chosen means of achieving that purpose, including (as in D.C., Sacramento,
and elsewhere) “taking from one businessman for the benefit of another
businessman.” 165 In short, Berman’s “public purpose” doctrine made judicial review so deferential that “public use” imposes no meaningful limitation on takings. 166 In a notorious 1995 opinion, Kelo v. City of New
London, 167 the Court upheld a redevelopment agency’s condemnation of
property in order to make it available to private developers. Justice
O’Connor, dissenting, called it a radical expansion of constitutional takings
authority. 168 Prominent commentators agreed. 169 The result was, however,
merely a straightforward application of Berman.
Judicial deference does not extend to racial discrimination, of course.
A claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
however, requires proof of discriminatory intent by the government. 170
There appears to be none in the Japantown case. In theory, extreme disparate impact might suffice as evidence of intent, but only in “rare” cases
where a “clear pattern . . . [is] unexplainable on grounds other than race.” 171
Project 2-A, however, could be explained on economic and esthetic
grounds.
B. “Just compensation”
According to the Supreme Court, fair market value at the time of the
taking suffices as “just compensation” under the Takings Clause. 172 The
SRA’s stated objective was to compensate property owners with the fair
market value of their properties, and it obtained two independent appraisals
before doing so. 173 Japantown property owners believed the SRA attempted
to purchase property at unfairly low prices until one owner demanded a

165. Id.
166. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 517 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here is no justification for the almost complete deference [the Court] grants to legislatures as to
what satisfies [public use].”).
167. Id. at 488–89.
168. See id. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
169. See e.g., Richard Epstein, Kelo: An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355, 361 (2005).
170. Vill. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
171. Id. at 266. Some antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII and the Fair Housing Act,
however, do not require discriminatory intent and permit liability based on “disparate impact” alone.
See Samuel Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1121, 1127 (2016). But no such
statute existed at the time of urban renewal in the 1950s.
172. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
173. SR 1961, supra note 1, at 7; URS 1964, supra note 140 at 6.

1026

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 92:3

court proceeding to determine fair value. 174 But even when compensation
satisfies doctrinal notions of “fair market value,” it is insufficient to compensate many displaced persons. The Court has defined “fair market value”
to be “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.” 175 This
formulation discounts the obvious fact that many owners displaced by government takings are not “willing sellers,” at market price or any other
price. 176
Furthermore, the fact that fair market value is computed as of the time
of the taking 177 was inherently unfair in the urban renewal context. Commentators noted as early as 1957 (shortly after the Japantown acquisitions
began) that the designation of areas as “blighted” under the CRL would
initiate a slide in property values. As the planning process dragged on, values would fall still further before local RDAs finally made appraisals and
offers. 178 Sacramento’s Ordinance 1480 declared the entire West End
“blighted” in 1950, but acquisition of Japantown parcels did not begin until
1956, and was not completed until 1960. 179 A Japantown property owner
thus could have experienced a full decade of declining value before receiving an offer from the SRA.
In addition, the market-value doctrine entitles renters (whether residents or businesses) to little or no compensation. Seventy-five percent of
nonwhites living in the West End in 1950 were renters. 180 While a displaced tenant is theoretically entitled to compensation for lost lease value, 181 the market value of a lease is typically about the same as the rent due
under the contract. Because displaced tenants no longer pay that rent, their
damages are usually little or nothing. 182 Furthermore, most leases in the
Project 2-A area had clauses protecting landlords from liability to tenants in
the event of government seizure of the property. 183
At the hearings, a JARSA representative pointed out that although alternative housing might exist, it might be unavailable to relocated Japan-

174. WILDIE, supra note 8.
175. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
176. See Coniston v. Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
177. See Olson, 292 U.S. at 255.
178. Jacobs & Levine, supra note 161, at 266.
179. See Lastufka, supra note 133, at 38.
180. Id. at 73.
181. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945).
182. Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1083, 1088–89 (1987).
183. See Tom Goff, City Promises Fair Deal in Mall Project, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 16, 1954, at
A1.
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town residents for both economic and “social” reasons. 184 As noted above,
private housing discrimination was legal at the time, and appears to have
been practiced against Japanese Americans. Thus, many neighborhoods
outside the West End were off-limits to displaced minority residents. Cost
was a further barrier. According to a local real estate agent, receiving fair
market value for homes in Project 2-A would not enable displaced owners
to afford comparable homes elsewhere in the city. 185 The very presence of
minority residents was known to depress property values, as NAREB admonished its members in the 1920s.186 In Sacramento, for example, property values fell in the neighborhoods surrounding Japantown because white
people did not want to live nearby. 187 As noted above, FHA loan guidelines
excluded borrowers of color and required restrictive covenants. The FHA
refused to insure home loans in older urban neighborhoods, making it difficult to finance improvements and contributing to further deterioration. 188
Displaced business owners experienced additional uncompensated
harms. Thomas Mapel, a real estate appraiser who had conducted appraisals for the city in past eminent domain proceedings, testified at the Project
2-A hearings that only the value of real property was compensable; the lost
value of a business on the property would not be compensated. 189 Like
residential renters, business owners who rented their premises were unlikely to receive any compensation. According to Mapel, appraising the value
of a business was overly speculative. Business losses related to displacement, such as selling inventory at a loss, would not be compensated. In
response, a lawyer representing a business owner asked rhetorically,
“Would you be willing to sell your property and all your business for the
market value of your real property?” 190 SRA Chair Fred Grumm defended
the limited compensation by pointing out that federal Title I funding could
be used only for the purchase of real property. 191 But no law prohibited
Sacramento from using city money to compensate business losses. Accord-

184. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 20.
185. Id. at 36 (comments of W. P. Wright).
186. Hernandez, supra note 39, at 39–40.
187. WILDIE, supra note 8, at 38.
188. GELFAND, supra note 35, at 59, 123.
189. See Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 2, at 13–14 (comments of Mr. Mapel); see also
id. pt. 3, at 22–27 (comments of Nathaniel Colley).
190. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 70 (comments of Thomas Hunt, lawyer for John
Shelby, owner of Shelby Hardware).
191. Id. at 56. Shortly after the hearings, the federal government began providing $100 toward
moving expenses for residents and $2500 for businesses; these amounts were increased to $200 and
$3000 in 1959. See SR 1961, supra note 1, at 8. These payments were limited to moving expenses,
however, and did not cover any other costs or losses. See GELFAND, supra note 35, at 216.
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ing to Toko Fujii, however, federal officials had advised the city not to do
so. 192
One Japantown business owner pointed out the obvious at the hearings: “You forget we are Japanese, and face discrimination.” 193 Even if
displaced businesses could find new quarters outside of Japantown, they
might be unable to establish a new customer base. In a letter to the SRA,
the Latin-American Political and Welfare Committee stated, “Some people
do not like to live next to Negroes, Japanese, Chinese, or Mexicans . . . Will these businessmen be able to open up shop in different surroundings regardless of race, creed or color?” 194 In addition to facing
racism, small neighborhood businesses would have difficulty competing in
new locations, especially against large, established businesses. 195 One of
the SRA’s own reports noted that businesses in ethnic enclaves like Japantown relied on the ethnic makeup of the neighborhood for their customer
base and might be unable to survive elsewhere. 196
Sacramento’s ethnic Japanese found homes and business premises
were available in Japantown precisely because it was Japantown: as an
ethnic enclave, it provided freedom from discrimination and harassment, as
well as affordable real estate prices and rents. The enclave also provided
unique cultural and social value that was lost by every denizen when the
neighborhood was dispersed. The destruction of an ethnic neighborhood
like Japantown destroys a “way of life centered on networked residences
and community centers such as churches and shops. Thus, the loss to the
individual is compounded . . . by the size and vitality of the community
destroyed.” 197 The refusal of Japantown’s residents and businesses to sell at
market value may have been idiosyncratic to members of that community,
but for clear and understandable reasons. Limiting “just compensation” to
market value denies the importance of these values.
The dispersal of a community can inflict uncompensated psychological harm. A 1947 study by the U.S. Department of the Interior found that
wartime evacuation had caused the “uprooting” of Japantowns, interrupting
“cultural practices which had stabilized the immigrant communities” and
causing “a profound psychological shock which has carried over . . . to the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 3, at 67.
Id. at 79 (comments of I. Sugiyama).
Id. pt. 3, at 11.
Id. pt. 1, at 37 (comments of W. P. Wright).
Id. at 47 (testimony of Toko Fujii (citing SACRAMENTO REDEV. AGENCY, REPORT NO. 6,
TENTATIVE PLAN AND REPORT FOR CAPITOL MALL AREA PROJECT NO. 2-A, at 12 (1954))).
197. J. Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low-Income Residential Communities Under the Takings
Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 131, 163 (2005).
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postwar adjustment period.” 198 According to the report, former internees’
“most notable characteristic . . . is a feeling of unsettledness, of having
unanswered questions concerning location, economic activity and social
adjustment.” 199 The dispersion and destruction of Japantown likely caused
similar psychological harm: at the redevelopment hearings, many residents
compared the plans to their wartime removal; former residents repeat that
sentiment today. 200 Indeed, psychological effects like those found in internees were also found in persons displaced by urban renewal in Washington,
D.C. and Boston in the 1960s. 201 Many showed signs of depression and
failed to make new social connections. 202
VI. DIGNITY TAKINGS
A. Dignity Takings and Constitutional Takings
As the foregoing shows, the seizure and destruction of Japantown
probably satisfied constitutional requirements. Constitutional takings doctrine fails to account for the harms to the Japantown community. The concept of “dignity takings” fills this gap. A dignity taking occurs when “the
state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from
owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.” 203 Bernadette Atuahene developed this concept to describe South African apartheid regime’s policy of dispossessing
native persons and moving them to segregated townships to separate them
from whites. 204 In the 1960s, the government began eliminating the townships and forcing Africans to move to designated “homelands.” 205 The
perceived inferiority of Africans and other nonwhites was central to the
apartheid state: “the motivating ideology” behind dispossession was the
belief that “Africans, like farm animals, did not belong in the city.” 206 One
government report from the 1920s argued that Africans should be allowed

198. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 15, at 1.
199. Id.
200. See generally REPLACING THE PAST: SACRAMENTO’S REDEVELOPMENT HISTORY (Center for
Sacramento History 2016).
201. Byrne, supra note 197, at 136.
202. Id.
203. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 6, at 817.
204. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 1–2. (2016).
205. Id. at 11.
206. Id. at 8.
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in cities only insofar as they were “willing . . . to minister to the needs of
the white man.” 207
The apartheid takings, the prototypical dignity takings, certainly fail to
satisfy the requirements of the Takings Clause. They were completely uncompensated and their express purpose was intentional racial discrimination. 208 Because the Takings Clause and similar constitutional provisions in
other countries nominally require a public purpose and just compensation,
Atuahene posits “constitutional takings” as justifiable expropriations that
serve as the polar opposite of dignity takings. 209 As the above discussion
indicates, however, constitutional takings doctrine (at least in the U.S.)
often fails to provide fair compensation and does not actually review
whether a taking serves a “public purpose.” Thus government expropriations of private property, including Project 2-A, may constitute dignity
takings even if they are constitutional.
B. Japantown and Dignity Takings
1. Government Intent and Indifference
While Project 2-A was not nearly as vicious or expressly racist as the
expropriations under apartheid, it could nonetheless be seen as dehumanizing. If all human beings are created equal, singling out members of a subgroup for worse treatment suggests that they are considered less than
human. The targeting of Japantown was consistent with a long history of
overt and intentional discrimination, rendering intentional dehumanization
a plausible motive. Moreover, anti-Japanese racism was so pervasive, particularly in Central California, that unconscious racism may have played a
role. By the time of urban renewal, America had a long history of denying
persons of Japanese descent, including U.S. citizens, many legal rights
available to others, including members of other minority groups. Subordination of Asians in America has long taken the form of presuming they are
unassimilable, permanent foreigners, and passing laws to reinforce their
separateness. As noted above, federal law denied Japanese the naturalization and immigration privileges extended to persons of other races. California and other states denied noncitizen Japanese the right to purchase
farmland and to hold certain occupations. During World War II, Japanese

207. Id. at 9.
208. Id. at 41.
209. Id.
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aliens and U.S.-born Japanese-American citizens alike were incarcerated en
masse based on the notion that disloyalty to America was a racial trait. 210
Many contemporary observers find it difficult to appreciate the prevalence of explicitly racist American laws as recently as the mid-twentieth
century. When the Japantown redevelopment plans were released in 1954,
the U.S. had only begun to reverse policies that expressly discriminated
against Japanese and Japanese Americans. The last incarceration camps
closed in 1945, but returnees faced resentment and even violence. The Immigration and Nationality Act had just ended the ban on Japanese naturalization in 1952; it permitted Japanese immigration, but only subject to strict
quotas. Such reforms as occurred were due to judicial and Congressional
action, not the government or voters of California or Sacramento. California’s supreme court invalidated the Alien Land Law in 1952, 211 but of
course the lifting of the federal naturalization ban rendered the statute
toothless anyway.
In addition, other racist laws remained in place. As noted above, private housing discrimination remained legal under state and federal law
until 1967. The Supreme Court decisions upholding the wartime evacuation
and curfew orders remained good law (and have still not been overturned).
Indeed, even Ex parte Endo, the Court’s opinion that helped close the
camps, did not disturb the racist presumption of Japanese-American disloyalty: it held only that the U.S. could not detain citizens, like Mitsue Endo,
once it had conceded their loyalty. 212 The federal government did not apologize for the camps until 1988.
Despite the prevalence of discrimination, there appears to be no direct
evidence that Project 2-A was intended to dehumanize Japanese Americans. However, government decision makers repeatedly dismissed concerns
expressed by Japanese Americans, suggesting their values, opinions and
community were less important than aesthetics and tax revenues. Urban
renewal’s disproportionate effect on Japantowns and other minority neighborhoods could not have come as a surprise to the state and federal legislators behind the CRL and Title I. The focus on replacing low-value
properties obviously disadvantaged minority neighborhoods. Civil rights
leaders had foreseen Title I’s disproportionate effects even before its pas210. See Hohri v. United States, 782 F. 2d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987)
(quoting Lt. General John L. DeWitt). But see Alexandre Kedar, Dignity Takings and Dispossession in
Israel, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 866, 883 (2016) (arguing that although Israeli law “delegitimized Arabs
and conceived them as radical others, enemies or potential enemies,” that was distinguishable from
treating them as inferior).
211. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 617 (Cal. 1952).
212. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944).
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sage, and had lobbied—unsuccessfully—for antidiscrimination rules, as
well as for giving displaced residents priority in returning to redeveloped
areas. 213
One SRA member acknowledged that discrimination would be an obstacle to the relocation of Japantown residents, but disavowed responsibility for fighting it: “We’re going to encourage tolerance, but we cannot
guarantee we can solve the problem . . . . It is true there are practical bars
but they are not what they used to be. Improvement is being made.” 214 Indeed, he seemed not to comprehend or believe the objections raised at the
hearing, dismissively attributing them to a failure to understand the redevelopment plan. 215 Similarly, after the first session of hearings, the mayor
told reporters, “we can’t let ourselves be made suckers through emotional
appeals to us on one side or the other.” 216
2. Subjective Experience of Dehumanization
If a group is generally subordinated by society, each incidence of government mistreatment of its members may further imply or affirm their
subordinate status, regardless of the actual intent. 217 Thus Atuahene suggests that both “top-down” evidence of government intent and “bottom-up”
evidence of dispossessed persons’ subjective experience are relevant to
determining whether dehumanization occurred. 218 Testimony at the Project
2-A hearings clearly, and sometime eloquently, evidences residents’ subjective perception of the plan as dehumanizing. In light of the long, recent,
and ongoing history of invidious discrimination against them, their subjective experience of dignitary harm seems objectively reasonable.
Henry Taketa argued that Sacramento was valuing civic beautification
more highly than its Japanese-American residents and unfairly concentrating the costs on the Japantown community. 219 He asked for “charity, humanity, and fair treatment.” 220 Arthur Mitsutome of the Senator Lions Club
insisted on “fair play” and decried the “utter disregard for the rights of
individuals.” 221 Toko Fujii told voters to insist that city and SRA officials
213. GELFAND, supra note 35, at 212–13.
214. Tom Goff, West End Gains Reassurance on New Locations, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 22,
1954, at 16 (quoting H. Harold Leavey).
215. See Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 60.
216. Loans Would Aid West End Rebuilding, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 1954, at A1.
217. See Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 6, at 799. But see id.
(noting Carol Rose’s suggestion that a dignity taking requires intent to dehumanize or infantilize).
218. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 6, at 811–12.
219. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 14.
220. Id. at 21.
221. Id. at 73.
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conduct redevelopment “with a touch of equity, fairness, and human kindness.” 222
Witnesses linked this perception of unfairness to their historic experience of racist mistreatment. Fujii stated that because of their unjust treatment during the war, Japanese Americans sought fairness not just for
themselves, but for everyone. 223 Other residents specifically compared their
threatened displacement to their evacuation and incarceration during the
war. (Former residents continue to make this comparison. 224) Henry
Taketa of JARSA pointed out that Japanese Americans had been “forcibly
kicked out” of the area before and had only recently reestablished Japantown; starting over yet again would be difficult and costly. 225 One business
owner pointed out that Japantown residents had had to “start life all over
again” only eight years earlier. 226 Removing Japantown residents again
would “put salt on a deep wound just beginning to heal.” 227 “What other
people have had to take so much as the Japanese?” he asked. 228 A Japanese-American priest referred to the “mental and spiritual hardship” of the
wartime incarceration and asked the city not to repeat it. 229 One elderly
returnee from the camps pointed out that a second displacement would be
especially hard on Japantown’s senior citizens, many of whom had become
more frail since their first removal in 1942.230 A representative of the
American Baptist Convention (who was apparently non-Japanese) said,
directly addressing the mayor, “I am surprised . . . that you allow [the SRA]
to come in here and pick on the Japanese a second time.” 231
Many residents testifying at the hearings argued that the treatment of
their neighborhood made them feel less than fully American. They took
pains to emphasize their American identity. The speakers included Japanese-American members of quintessentially American institutions like
VFW posts and the Lions Club. Speaking on behalf the JACL, Toko Fujii
made sure to point out that it “is entirely composed of American citizens.”
Henry Taketa declared that that Japanese-Americans are “one hundred

222. Id. at 47.
223. Id. at 47.
224. See generally, e.g., REPLACING THE PAST: SACRAMENTO’S REDEVELOPMENT HISTORY, supra
note 200.
225. Project 2-A Hearings, pt. 1, at 9–11.
226. Id. at 77 (comments of Sugiyama).
227. Id. at 79.
228. Id. at 78.
229. Id. at 74 (comments of S. Sasaki).
230. Id. at 75–76 (comments of Giichi Aoki).
231. Id. at 84.
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percent citizens and residents.” 232 Frank Yoshimura, Commander of a Nisei
VFW post, called it “undemocratic” and “un-American” to concentrate the
costs of redevelopment on the Japantown community. 233 Arthur Mitsutome
said the conduct of redevelopment conflicted with “the American democratic way of life.” 234 Another speaker pointed out that many Japanese immigrants had become naturalized citizens since the recent repeal of racial
ineligibility in 1952, but now feared they would not “enjoy full rights as
citizens of this country.” 235 He argued that the destruction of Japantown ran
afoul of the Constitution, and insisted, to applause, that “all men are created
equal and enjoy equal rights.” 236
Speakers at the hearings also alluded to discrimination against African-Americans and Mexican-Americans. Nathaniel Colley called for regulations preventing racial discrimination in the redeveloped neighborhood so
that “blight” would not be replaced by “the blight of bigotry.” 237 He noted
that the Sacramento Real Estate Board had expressed support for such a
rule, but also pointed out that the real estate industry had built many new
homes elsewhere in the area, “none of which they have sold to us.” 238 “Us”
presumably refers to Black persons, since Colley pioneered housing discrimination litigation on behalf of Sacramento’s African American residents and was himself African-American. 239 Colley also called for
guarantees that relocation would not be racially segregated. 240 The Reverend E.C. Regalada stated that Project 2-A included a significant MexicanAmerican population. He said that community did not oppose redevelopment, but doubted whether they would be treated with “justice” because of
“the propaganda against this [sic] illegal aliens.” 241
VII. CONCLUSION
The Japantown residents and business owners displaced by urban renewal were organized and informed long-term residents, many of whom
were U.S.-born citizens. They articulated their concerns through prescribed
232. Id. at 9.
233. Id. at 72.
234. Id. at 73.
235. Id. at 78.
236. Id. at 79.
237. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 3, at 26.
238. Id. at 26–27.
239. Colley was the lead attorney in Ming v. Horgan, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 693 (Vanderbilt Univ.
Sch. of Law) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958).
240. Project 2-A Hearings, supra note 91, pt. 3, at 27.
241. Id. at 37–38.
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democratic processes. Nonetheless, they found themselves ignored. There
is no direct evidence that racial discrimination influenced local authorities’
initial choice to destroy Japantown or their refusal to consider residents’
objections. It is unfortunately common for governments to favor industry
over communities and to ignore citizens’ objections. But the national, state
and local history of anti-Japanese racism makes unspoken or unconscious
discrimination a plausible factor in the treatment of Japantown. Moreover,
it makes the subjective perception of dehumanization an objectively reasonable reaction to the destruction of the community and the government’s
refusal to consider residents’ objections.
Atuahene’s original study examined South Africa’s attempts to address the dignitary harms caused by egregiously illegitimate property takings. As dignity takings theory develops and attempts to identify less
extreme examples, it will need standards for evaluating just compensation
and legitimate public purpose, analyses that U.S. courts have reserved to
political processes. The future analytical value of the model lies in its ability to expose the kinds of harms that existing takings protection, in the U.S.
and elsewhere, fails to prevent or compensate. The urban renewal of Sacramento’s Japantown provides examples of such harms.
Atuahene argues that dignity takings require more than market value
compensation. Rather, they require “dignity restoration,” in which dispossessed persons receive compensation “through processes that affirm their
humanity and reinforce their agency.” 242 Post-apartheid South Africa has
attempted to do so (with mixed results) through its elaborate reconciliation
processes. In 1988, decades after the closure of the camps, the U.S. issued
monetary reparations to Japanese Americans who had been incarcerated.
Moreover, the payments were accompanied by the government’s formal
apology.
Sacramento has never formally apologized for the destruction of
Japantown, and the story has been largely forgotten. The only physical
reminder of the lost community is a small outdoor display on an untrafficked downtown street. As Sacramento’s aging urban-renewal era downtown undergoes another renewal, however, interest in Sacramento’s
redevelopment history has increased. A recent book, televised documentary, and museum display 243 have examined the urban-renewal experience
242. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 6, at 796.
243. See WILDIE, supra note 8; REPLACING THE PAST: SACRAMENTO’S REDEVELOPMENT
HISTORY, supra note 200; see also Traci Rockefeller Cusack, History Museum to Debut New “Making
of Old Sacramento” Exhibit in February, SACRAMENTO PRESS (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://sacramentopress.com/2016/01/04/history-museum-to-debut-new-making-of-old-sacramentoexhibit-in-february/ [https://perma.cc/WRW8-H9P7].
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of Japantown and the West End’s other lost neighborhoods. Such acknowledgment and reassessment are small but important first steps toward restoring the dignity of dispossessed persons.

